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TITLE IX AND SAME-GENDER SEXUAL HARASSMENT:
SCHOOL DISTRICT LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES
Karen L. Michaelis*

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court recently decided three important cases
concerning sexual harassment. 1 This trilogy of cases is key to
understanding the current judicial position regarding employer
liability for sexual harassment involving co-workers of the
same gender, institutional liability for the sexual misconduct of
teachers with students, and school district liability for student
to student sexual harassment.
With Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 2 Gebser
v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 3 and more recently
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 4 the Supreme

* Karen L. Michaelis, Ph.D. 1988, University of Wisconsin-Madison; J.D. 1989,
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Psychology.
1. See Oncale v. Sundowner, 523 U.S. 75 (1998); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep.
Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661
(1999).
2. 523 U.S. 75 (1998). Joseph Oncale was repeatedly subjected to sexual taunts
and mock sexual acts by his co-workers. Despite Oncale's complaints to his supervisor
about the conditions in the workplace caused by his co-workers' acts, Oncale's supervisors took no action to stop the harassment. Ultimately, Joseph Oncale quit his job because of the ongoing sexual harassment.
3. 524 U.S. 274 (1998). A female high school student, Alida Gebser, had a sexual
relationship with a male teacher. Gebser did not report the relationship to school officials, but when officials discovered the relationship, the teacher was fired. Contrary to
federal regulations, the district did not have a "formal antiharassment policy" or an
"official grievance procedure" at the time of the sexual relationship. Id. at 282. Gebser
sued the district for damages under Title IX.
4. 526 U.S. 629 (1999). LaShonda Davis alleged that the school district's deliberate indifference to her complaints of sexual harassment by a male student "created
an intimidating, hostile, offensive, and abusive school environment," in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. Id. at 1668. The Supreme Court held that
there is a private cause of action for damages under Title IX for student to student
sexual harassment, "but only where the funding recipient is deliberately indifferent to
47
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Court has begun the process of clarifying the various judicial
approaches used to determine employer and institutional liability for different forms of sexual harassment. Existing
precedents indicate that courts are generally quite hesitant to
hold school districts liable for hostile environment sexual harassment. And in the area of peer sexual harassment between
students of the opposite sex, the result is the same. Courts consistently hold that school districts will not be liable under the
pre-Davis standard for harassment that occurs between private
individuals who are not employed by the school district. 5
Student victims of peer sexual harassment have tried several approaches in their attempts to hold school districts monetarily responsible for harm done by third party non-employees. 6
Virtually all of these cases have failed under a variety of legal
theories. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. 7 offers
yet another approach in cases where individuals are subjected
to sexual harassment by their co-workers of the same gender.
But based on all the legal theories previously considered by
various courts, Oncale does not appear to offer much assistance
to students subjected to sexual harassment by another student
of the same gender. Additionally, the effect of Oncale was that
the standard of liability for sexual harassment, based on Title
VII agency principles, was no longer the standard by which
students could seek to hold school districts responsible for sexual harassment where the perpetrator was either a school district employee or another student. In other words, the Supreme
Court made it clear in Oncale that the Title VII agency standard applies only to sexual harassment in the workplace. 8
Prior to 1998, most lower courts agreed that the appropriate
standard of liability in Title IX cases was based on Title VII
agency principles.
Despite a significant increase in the number of cases of sexual harassment in schools over the last ten years, courts consexual harassment, of which the recipient has actual knowledge, and that harassment
is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school." ld.
at 1675.
5. See Deshaney v. Department of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (holding that
there is no agency liability for private conduct).
6. Third party non-employees are any individuals not employed by the school
district, including other students, who may sexually harass or abuse students at school.
7. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
8. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
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sistently have provided an escape from liability for school districts seeking to avoid paying monetary damages to student
victims of peer sexual harassment. Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District 9 and Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education 10 offer the first look at how post-Oncale courts deal
with same-gender sexual harassment cases where both perpetrator and victim are students. Beyond the unwillingness of
most lower courts to hold school districts liable for sexual harassment of students, lower courts will have to determine how
the new standard applies in peer sexual harassment cases
brought under Title IXll in the wake of Gebser and Davis. The
prevailing approach has been to adopt the Title VII 12 standard
and apply it in Title IX cases. 13 Recently, however, some courts
have held that the Title VII standard only applies in the employment context. 14 Courts appear to have accepted this new

9. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
10. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
11. Title IX provides that: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... " 42 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a) (1999).
12. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides: "[I]t shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U .S.C.S. § 2000e-(a)(1)
(1999).
13. See Nelson v. Almont Community Sch., 931 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Mich. 1996);
Pallett v. Palma, 914 F. Supp. 1018 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Burrow v. Postville Community
Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193 (N.D. Iowa 1996); "[T]he court determined that Title VII
is 'the most appropriate analogue when defining Title IX's substantive standards."
Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1022 (W.D. Mo. 1995), quoting
Mabry v. State Board of Community Colleges and Occupational Education, 813 F.2d
311, 317, n. 6 (lOth Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U. S. 849; "In Lipsett v. University of
Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988) the court concluded that hostile environment
lawsuits by school district employees are permitted under Title IX and adopted Title
VII's standards for assessing a hostile environment claim." Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch.
Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1022 (W.D. Mo 1995).
14. Title VII applies only in employment cases: See Haines v. Metropolitan Gov't
of Davidson County, 32 F. Supp. 2d 991, 998 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) (citing Oona v. McCaffrey, 143 F.3d 473, 477 (9th Cir. 1998)); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp.
1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993)(Court adopted Title VI standard, rejecting Title VII standard
stating that the Title VII agency standard applies only to employment-related harassment.). Title VII does not apply to sexual harassment cases involving student to student harassment: See Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F. Supp. 64, 72 (D.N.H.
1997)("[T]he court looks to Title VII principles for guidance, but adopts a flexible approach sensitive to the differences between peer sexual harassment and employment
contexts."). Employers are liable "for failures to remedy or prevent a hostile or offensive
work environment of which management-level employers knew, or in the exercise of
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approach, thereby closing virtually all existing avenues of recovery for sexual harassment between student peers. The end
result under this new paradigm most likely will be to provide
protection for adult workers against sexual harassment by coworkers of either sex. Meanwhile, students in public schools
will have limited protection, if any, against peer sexual harassment regardless of the perpetrator's gender.
This paper is divided into six parts. Part I traces the existence of a private cause of action for sexual harassment under
Titles VI, 15 VII, and IX through landmark Supreme Court decisions in each area. Title VII has shaped most of our understanding of the standard for institutional liability in sexual
harassment cases. Therefore, Part I also contains a detailed
examination of the Supreme Court's approach to establishing
the existence of a private cause of action for sexual harassment
in Title VII cases. This includes an analysis of how the meaning of the "because of sex" 16 requirement affects the determination of the existence of a private cause of action for sexual harassment under Titles VI, VII, and IX.
In Part II, the standard of liability under Title VI and Title
VII will be examined from a historical perspective beginning
with the Supreme Court's decision in Guardians Association v.
Civil Services Commission of New York. 17 This part will consider the issue of whether discriminatory intent is an essential
element to establish liability under either Title VI or Title VII.
The availability and type of damages under Titles VI and VII
will be discussed to predict the availability of damages under
Title IX.
Part III traces the existence of private causes of action under Title IX from Franklin 18 to the present, including the Supreme Court's consideration of the issues of intent and damages in Title IX sexual harassment cases. Part IV examines the

reasonable care should have known." ld. at 81 (citing Doe v. Petaluma, 830 F. Supp.
1560, 1572 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (citing Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881 (9th Cir. 1!l91)
(quoting EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1515-16 (9th Cir. 1989)).
15. Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides: "No person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participa·
tion in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S. C.§ 2000d. (1999).
16. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63 (1986) (quoting Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-2(a)(1)).
17. 463 U.S. 582 (1982).
18. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
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application of the Title VI actual knowledge standard and the
Title VII constructive knowledge standard in Title IX cases.
Part V suggests that courts are abandoning the Title VII
constructive knowledge standard in favor of the Title VI strict
liability standard in same-gender sexual harassment cases involving peers. The shift has resulted from a reexamination of
the legislative history of Title VI which provides a more accurate guide than Title VII in determining the appropriate standard of liability under Title IX.
Part VI presents a review of the three recent Supreme
Court decisions that have separated the issues-same-gender
sexual harassment between co-workers, teacher to student
sexual harassment, and peer sexual harassment between students. In these cases, the Supreme Court has articulated three
separate standards based on the relationship between the perpetrator and the victim.
I. Is THERE A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR SEXUAL
HARASSMENT?
This threshold question of whether a private plaintiff has a
cause of action against a defendant under a federal statute
such as Title IX needs to be answered before a court can determine an appropriate remedy, if any, for alleged wrongdoing.
For some time, the Supreme Court has struggled with the issue
of determining the existence of a private cause of action. In
Cort v. Ash, the Court announced a four-part test to determine
Congressional intent to create a private right of action under
Title VI. 19 In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB, v. Vinson, the Court
recognized a private cause of action for hostile environment
sexual harassment under Title VII. 20 In Cannon v. University
19. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The four-part test is as follows: 1) Plaintiff is a member of
the class "for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted;" 2) There is any "indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit," to support such a remedy; 3) An implied
private right of action is consistent with the purposes of the legislative scheme; and 4)
The cause of action is not "one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically
the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action
based solely on federal law." Id. at 78.
20. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). In Meritor, a female employee was sexually harassed by
her male supervisor who touched her inappropriately in public, and made sexual demands that she submitted to out of fear of losing her job. ld. Meritor was the first Supreme Court case to address hostile environment sexual harassment in the workplace
under Title VII. Id. The Meritor test has been relied on in sexual harassment cases
arising in the workplace and in the school setting under Titles VII and IX in deter-
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of Chicago, the Court recognized an implied private right of action under Title IX. 21
In Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 22 Justices
Powell, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun assumed, without
deciding, that a private cause of action existed under Title VI.
Justice White argued that Title VII provided no private cause
of action, but Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was
available to private plaintiffs challenging discriminatory conduct committed under color of state law. Justices Stevens, Burger, Stewart, and Rehnquist concluded that a private cause of
action was available under Title VII. 23
Then in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 24 the Court held
that there was a private cause of action, based on the Cort factors,25 for gender-based discrimination under Title IX against
"any educational program supported by federal funds." 26 In
Cannon, eight justices agreed that the legislative history of
both Title VI and Title VII supported the conclusion that a private cause of action could be implied under Title IX.
The question of a private right of action arose again in the
late 1980s as instances of sexual harassment and abuse of
public school students came to light. This time the question
was whether or not Congress had created an implied right of
action under Title IX for the sexual harassment of students by
teachers. The issue seemed to be settled in a 1992 case, when

mining liability. Id. The three part test states: (1) "that a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or
abusive work environment," without showing economic effect on the plaintiffs employment, id. at 66, (2) "that the fact that sex-related conduct is 'voluntary,' in the
sense that a plaintiff was not forced to participate against her will, is not a defense to a
sexual harassment suit under Title VII," as the correct inquiry in such cases is whether
the plaintiff had indicated by her conduct that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, id. at 67, and (3) that employers are not "always automatically liable for sexual harassment of employees by their supervisors." !d. at 72.
21. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). Supreme Court recognized a private right of action under
Title IX for discrimination based on sex. In Cannon, a woman was denied admission to
certain medical schools on the basis of her sex. She sued the universities and several of
the medical schools' officials under Title IX arguing that she had been excluded from
participation in the medical school programs because of her sex and that those medical
schools were recipients of federal funds at the time of her exclusion.
22. 438 U.S. 265, 281-84 (1978).
23. See id. at 420, n.28.
24. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
25. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
26. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of the City of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 594
(1983) (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-703 (1979).
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the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Cannon that "Title
IX is enforceable through an implied right of action"27
However, sexual harassment cases have undergone at least
two metamorphoses since 1992. After the first wave of sexual
harassment/abuse cases where teachers harassed/abused students, a new harasser emerged-the fellow student. The question then became whether a private cause of action could exist
against a school district when the perpetrator was a private
third party. Most recently the question has become, is there a
private cause of action against a school district when a student
harasser is the same gender as the student victim. Additionally, the related questions of what standard of liability applies
to Title IX peer sexual harassment cases and what damages
are available to private parties for Title IX violations will be
examined.
Previously, several lower courts concluded that a private
cause of action exists where the harasser is the victim's superior.28 Now courts must struggle to determine whether Congress intended to allow private suits against state agents (i.e.
public school officials) for same-gender peer sexual harassment.
A series of recent Title VII cases has paved the way for our current understanding of the viability of a private, same-gender
sexual harassment claim under Title IX.
The fundamental requirement for a Title VII cause of action
is "that the discrimination occurs 'because of such individual's ... sex."' 29 Applying Title VII principles to cases of samegender sexual harassment, the threshold question is "whether
members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or

27. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992). A female student
complained the she had been sexually harassed and abused by a male teacher at the
school. The student alleged that school officials knew of the sexual harassment and
abuse, but they failed to take corrective action to stop the harassment. The Supreme
Court recognized a private cause of action for damages under Title IX against school
officials for teacher to student sexual harassment.
28. See, e.g., Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996);
Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006 (W.D. Mo. 1995).
29. Fredette v. BPV Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 1505 (ll'h Cir. 1997)
(citing Meritor Savs. Bank, FSB, v. Vinson 477 U.S. 57, 63 (1986)). This Title VII case
involved claims of same-sex harassment under both quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment theories. In Fredette, a male waiter was propositioned for sex
by the restaurant's homosexual maitre d'. Fredette complained that his refusals to accept the sexual propositions resulted in work-related retaliation against him. The question in Fredette was whether Title VII provided a cause of action for same-gender sexual harassment in the workplace.
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conditions of employment to which members of the other sex
are not exposed." 30 Therefore, the only actionable claim under
Title

VII

for sexual harassment is one " that is in some way

linked to the plaintiffs sex."31
Lower federal courts, relying in part on earlier sexual harassment cases in the workplace, have been grappling with the
same-gender sexual harassment issue since 1993. 32 In thirteen
cases, lower federal courts have held that same-gender sexual
harassment is actionable under Title VII. 3 3 During that same
period, ten lower federal courts held that Title

VII

provided no

cause of action for same-gender sexual harassment. 34 This split
in the lower courts led to the Supreme Court decision to hear
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. 35 in order to resolve the conflict. Prior to the March

1998 Oncale

decision, the

30. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (quoting
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
31. Doe v. City of Belleville, Ill., 119 F.3d 563, 570 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Carr v.
Allison Gas Turbine Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007, 1009 (7th Cir. 1994)). Two
teen boys, who were employed by the City of Belleville, were harassed by their male coworkers in an escalating sexual manner. Verbal taunts turned physical and the boys
decided to quit their jobs. The question in Doe was whether Title VII created a cause of
action for sexual harassment based on sex where both the victim and the harasser were
males.
32. See infra notes 33 and 34.
33. See Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 1997);
Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503 (11th Cir. 1997); Wrightson v.
Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996); McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256,
260 (7th Cir. 1996); Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996); Baskerville
v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995); Steiner v. Showboat Operating
Co., 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1082 (1995); Saulpaugh v.
Monroe Comm. Hasp., 4 F. 3d 134 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied 510 U.S. 1164 (1994); Purrington v. Univ. of Utah, 996 F.2d 1025 (lOth Cir. 1993); Morgan v. Massachusetts
Gen. Hasp., 901 F.2d 186 (1st Cir. 1990); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir.
1981); Barnes v. Castle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. &
Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
34. See Torres v. National Precision Blanking Div. of Nat'! Material L.P., 943 F.
Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Schoiber v. Emro Mktg. Co., 941 F. Supp. 730 (N.D. Ill.
1996); Larry v. North Miss. Med. Ctr., 940 F. Supp. 960 (N.D. Miss. 1996); Ashworth v.
Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp 489 (W.D. Wash. 1995); Sarff v. Continental Express, 894 F.
Supp. 1076 (S.D. Tex. 1995), aff'd without published opinion 85 F. 3d 624 (5th Cir.
1996); Meyers v. City ofEI Paso, 874 F. Supp. 1546 (W.D. Tex. 1995); Pasqua v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., No. 94 C 4418, 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17108 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16,
1995), aff'd on other grounds, 101 F.3d 514 (7th Cir. 1996); Fleenor v. Hewitt Soap Co.
67 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 1625 (S.D. Ohio 1994), aff'd on other grounds, 81 F.3d
48 (6th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 519 U.S. 863 (1996); Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'! Corp,
867 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Ind.1994), mod. on recons. 887 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ind. 1995);
Dillon v. Frank, 58 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 90 (E.D. Mich. 1990), aff'd by unpublished opinion 952 F.2d 403 (6th Cir. 1992).
35. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
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leading case concerning the existence of a cause of action under
Title VII for same-gender sexual harassment was Doe u. City of
Belleville, Illinois. 36 In Doe, a case involving conduct between
co-workers that the victim claimed amounted to sexual harassment, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had to find a
nexus between gender and harassment in order to conclude
that same-gender sexual harassment between co-workers was
actionable under Title VII.
Establishing the nexus between gender and harassment, for
the purpose of establishing a cause of action under Title VII for
same-gender sexual harassment, raises two questions:
1) Can a man ever establish that he was harassed 'because of
his sex in violation of Title VII, when the harassment he complains of was inflicted by another man? ...
2) If sexual harassment of a male by another male is actionable under Title VII, must the plaintiff offer proof, beyond the
explicitly sexual nature of the harassment, that his gender
motivated the harasser and that a similarly situated female
worker would not have been harassed? 37

The second question inquires whether or not a plaintiff
must prove that the harasser is "sexually oriented toward the
same gender." 38 That is, does the plaintiff have to prove that
the harasser is a homosexual, and therefore attracted to the
victim "because of' his sex?
Responding "yes" to the initial inquiry and "no" to the second, the Seventh Circuit concluded that same-gender sexual
harassment is actionable under Title VII because "Title VII on
its face draws no distinction between men and women, either
as plaintiffs or harassers, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) describes sexual harassment in
gender-neutral terms."39
While some recent case law suggests that the victim of
same-gender sexual harassment does not have to prove that
the harasser is attracted to the victim because of the harasser's
attraction to members of the same sex. 40 Judge Niemeyer for

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997).
119 F.3d at 570.
!d.
!d.
See Yeary v. Goodwill lndus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 1997);
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the Fourth Circuit stated that "where the harasser and the victim are of the same gender, a presumption exists that sexually
suggestive conduct ... [between members of the same gender]
is usually motivated by entirely different reasons [than gender]."41 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit was hesitant to find a
cause of action for same-gender sexual harassment unless the
harasser was homosexual, "because in that type of case, an
employee can prove he was harassed by an employee of the
same sex 'because of the harassed employee's sex,' as required
by Title VII." 42
A few courts have held that same-gender sexual harassment is not actionable under Title VII, 43 but the predominant
opinion among lower courts is that same-gender sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII. 44 In March 1998, the
Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F. 3d 1503 (11th Cir. 1997). Yeary is a samegender sexual harassment case where a male worker alleged that he was sexually harassed by a male co-worker. The question in Yemy was whether there was a cause of
action under Title VII for same-gender sexual harassment.
41. Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 1508 (11th Cir. 1997)
(quoting Niemeyer, J., in Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 752 (4th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 818 (1996) (emphasis added).
42. Wrightson v. Pizza Hut, 99 F. 3d 138, 142 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting McWilliams
v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519
U.S. 819 (1996)).
43. See Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America, 28 F. 3d 446 (1994). Garcia is a Title VII same-gender sexual harassment case involving male co-workers. The Fifth Circuit Court did not recognize a cause of action for same-gender sexual harassment under
Title VII; Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996).
44. See Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc. 107 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 1997);
Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503 (11th Cir. 1997); Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996); Caldwell v. KFC Corp., 958 F. Supp. 962
(D.N.J. 1997); McCoy v. Macon Water Authority, 966 F. Supp. 1209 (M.D. Ga. 1997);
Gerd v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., 934 F. Supp. 357 (D. Colo. 1996); Williams v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1 ( D.D.C. 1996); Miller v. Vesta, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697
(E.D. Wis. 1996); Johnson v. Hondo, Inc. 940 F. Supp. 1403 (E.D. Wis. 1996); Peric v.
Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 71 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 1760 (N.D. Ill.
1996); Shermer v. Illinois Dept. of Transp., 937 F. Supp. 781 (C.D. Ill. 1996); Kaplan v.
Dacomed Corp., No. 95C6987, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2232 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 1996); Ton
v. Information Resources, Inc., 70 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 355 (N.D. Ill. 1996);
Waag v. Thomas Pontiac, Buick, GMC, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 393 (D. Minn. 1996); Wehrle
v. Office Depot, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Okla. 1996); Swage v. Inn Philadelphia, 72
FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 438 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Johnson v. Community Nursing
Servs., 932 F. Supp. 269 (D. Utah 1996); Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc.,
921 F. Supp. 1495 (E.D. Va. 1996); Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 905 F. Supp.
1368 (C.D. Cal. 1995), reu'd on other grounds, 114 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 1997); Raney v.
District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283 (D.D.C. 1995); Boyd v. Vonnahmen, 67 FAIR
EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 1769 (S.D. Ill. 1995); Blozis v. Mike Raisor Ford, Inc., 896 F.
Supp. 805 (N.D. Ind. 1995); Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, Div. Keystone Consol.
Indus., Inc., 887 F. Supp. 1133 (C.D. Ill. 1995); Sardinia v. Dellwood Food, Inc., No. 94
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Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision with Oncale, 45 thereby agreeing with the majority of lower courts that
same-gender sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII.
The Supreme Court appears to have adopted the Doe v. City
of Belleville 46 holding in Oncale: that same-gender sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII, and that Title VII protects both men and women against discrimination "because of
sex." 47 This is a landmark decision for adult co-workers subjected to same-gender sexual harassment in the workplace, but
an important question remains: what effect will the Oncale decision have on public school students subjected to sexual harassment by same-gender peers? Because the Oncale decision is
based on Title VII and not Title IX, it may not have much influence on cases of same-gender peer sexual harassment between students. But several courts that have considered sexual
harassment cases involving students have followed the Title
VII standard in sexual harassment cases involving students. 48
It remains to be seen what impact Oncale will have on student
to student sexual harassment cases.
II. STANDARDS OF LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT: Is
INTENT REQillRED?

There has been considerable litigation, both inside and outside the public school context, over whether or not a plaintiff is
required to prove discriminatory intent in order to establish a
violation of a federal statute and qualify for some remedy. Litigation outside the school context has explored the intent issue

Civ. 5458 (LAP), 1995 WL 640502 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1995); King v. M. R. Brown, Inc.,
911 F. Supp. 161 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537
(M.D. Ala. 1983), aff'd without published op., 749 F. 2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright v.
Methodist Youth Servs., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
45. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998); See Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F. 3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996).
46. 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997).
47. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (quoting
Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682 (1983).
48. See Murray v. New York City College of Dentistry, 53 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1995);
Wright v. Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Burrow v. Postville Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Nelson v. Almont
Community Sch., 931 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Mich. 1996); Bruneau v. South Kortright
Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); Linson v. Trustees of the Univ. of
Pa., No. 95-3681, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12243 (E.D. Pa. August 21, 1996); Patricia H.
v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
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under both Title VI and Title VII. Various courts that relied on
these rulings later tried to answer the intent question under
Title IX. Therefore, a brief look at whether or not discriminatory intent is required under Titles VI and VII will set the
stage for a discussion of the resulting confusion that has arisen
over the issue of discriminatory intent in Title IX cases. It also
will illustrate the dilemma facing courts when they address the
issue of the existence of a cause of action under Title IX for
same-gender sexual harassment between students.
The difficulty in attempting to answer the question whether
or not discriminatory intent is required to establish a violation
of Title IX is that from the very beginning the Supreme Court
has not provided clear guidance on this point. The confusion
stems from the conflicting approaches the Supreme Court has
taken in several key cases which make it difficult to know if
applications of Title IX will be guided by interpretations of Title VI, interpretations of Title VII, or some combination of the
two.
A. Title VI Standard

Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 49

Some courts have argued that Title IX should follow Title
VI requirements because Title IX is modeled after Title VI. In
Guardians Association v. Civil Services Commission of City of
New York, 50 the Supreme Court attempted to clarify whether
discriminatory intent was an essential element of a Title VI
violation. Five justices agreed that the Court of Appeals erred
when it held that a private plaintiff was required to prove discriminatory intent to qualify for relief under Title VI. However,
the only thing that a majority of the justices in Guardians
could agree on was that Title VI relief was not appropriate under the facts presented in Guardians.
Justice White, speaking for the majority in Guardians, announced that discriminatory intent is not an essential element
49. 42 U.S. C.§ 2000d. (1999).
50. 463 U.S. 582 (1982).
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of a Title VI violation. This opened the door for a private plaintiff to seek relief for unintentional discrimination under Title
VI. Relief for unintentional discrimination could come from a
violation of the administrative implementing regulations of Title VI, 51 adopted to enforce the provisions of Title VI. 52 Justice
White agreed with Justice Marshall in Guardians that the administrative regulations of Title VI, incorporating a disparate
impact standard, are valid. 53 As such, discriminatory intent is
not an essential element to establish a violation of Title VI,
even though "Title VI, in and of itself, does not proscribe disparate-impact discrimination." 54 This means that a plaintiff
bringing a private action claiming violations of both Title VI
and the administrative implementing regulations will be entitled to relief upon proof of disparate-impact discrimination
alone. The issue then becomes: what type of remedy will be allowed where there has been no intentional discrimination?
That issue will be discussed in the next section.
51. The administrative implementing regulations of Title VI state:
Each federal department and agency which is empowered to extend federal financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract other
than a contract or insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to effectuate
the provisions or section 2000d of this title with respect to such program or activity
by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial
assistance in connection with which the action is taken .... Compliance with any
requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity
to any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding on the record, after
opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement, but such
termination or refusal shall be limited to the particular political entity, or part
thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a finding has been made and, shall be
limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been found, or (2) by an other means authorized by law: provided,
however, that no such action shall be taken until the department or agency concerned has advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply with
the requirement and has determined that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means. In the case of any action terminating, or refusing to grant or continue,
assistance because of failure to comply with a requirement imposed pursuant to
this section, the head of the federal department or agency shall file with committees of the House and Senate having legislative jurisdiction over the program or
activity involved a full written report of the circumstances and the grounds for
such action. No such action shall be come effective until thirty days have elapsed
after the filing of such report.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1999).
52. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
53. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Servs. Comm'n of the City of New York, 463 U.S.
582 (1982).
54. Id. at 584 n.2.
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The Court's ruling in Guardians, that Title VI reaches both
intentional and unintentional discrimination, has found subsequent support in Alexander u. Choate, 55 as well as earlier support for the notion that Title VI does not require proof of discriminatory intent.5 6 While five justices agreed with the result
reached by the Court of Appeals, each justice reached that conclusion for different reasons.
Justice White, speaking for the majority in Guardians, held
that discriminatory intent is not an essential element of a Title
VI violation. Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger agreed
with the Court of Appeals that there is no implied private
cause of action under Title VI. Justices Burger and Rehnquist
believed that intentional discrimination is a prerequisite to a
successful Title VI claim, and Justice O'Connor argued that intentional discrimination is required to establish a valid Title VI
claim. As a result, Justice O'Connor concluded that the implementing regulations incorporating the disparate impact standard are not valid. Dissenting Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, disagreed with Justice O'Connor
and concluded that the administrative regulations, incorporating the disparate impact standard, are valid despite the fact
that Title VI itself requires proof of intentional discrimination.
Justice Marshall was the most lenient of all the justices in
stating that a private plaintiff needed only to prove disparate
impact discrimination to establish a violation of Title VI.
Therefore, based on Guardians, if an individual claims violations of both Title VI and its implementing regulations, then
proof of discriminatory intent is not an essential element. The
same rule also would apply under Title IX and its implementing regulations if the Guardians interpretation of Title VI were
followed. 57
Prior to the Supreme Court ruling in Davis u. Monroe
County Board of Education, 58 the Title VI standard applied to
sexual harassment cases in the public school setting required
proof of intentional discrimination as demonstrated by: 1) direct involvement of the school district in the discrimination; or
55.
56.
ols, 414
57.
1993).
58.

469 U.S. 287 (1985).
See also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Lau v. NichU.S. 563 (1974); Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481 (lOth Cir. 1996).
See Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agriculture, 998 F.2d 824 (lOth Cir.
526 U.S. 629 (1999).
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2) a showing that the school district had actual or constructive
knowledge about the sexual harassment of students, and that
the school failed to take immediate remedial action. 59 However,
Guardians established that the implementation regulations of
Title VI reach unintentional discrimination. Therefore, the current application of Title VI, requiring proof of intentional discrimination, is contrary to Guardians and imposes a higher
standard for student victims of sexual harassment than adult
victims are required to meet.

B. Damages
It seems fairly well-settled that money damages are available only in cases where the plaintiff has proven intentional
discrimination in Title VI and Title VII cases. This rule also is
finding acceptance in Title IX cases.
Relying on Guardians, 60 most courts have applied the following rule: "where legal rights have been invaded and a cause
of action is available, a federal court may use any available
remedy to afford full relief." 61 The only exception to this general rule is where application of the rule would violate the intent of Congress or frustrate the statute's purposes. 62 But, the
Court added that the amount of compensatory damages (money
damages) to be awarded for a defendant's intentional misconduct will depend "on the extent of his knowledge or culpability."63
C. Title VII Standard

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides:
[I]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-

59. See Nelson v. Almont Community Sch., 931 F. Supp. 1345, 1355 (E.D. Mich.
1996); Oona v. Santa Rosa City Sch., 890 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Howard v.
Board of Educ., 876 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Letlow v. Evans, 857 F. Supp. 676
(W.D. Mo. 1994); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1576 (N.D. Cal.
1993); Floyd v. Waiters, 831 F. Supp. 867 (M.D. Ga. 1993); R.L.R. v. Prague Pub. Sch.
Dist. I-103, 838 F. Supp. 1526 (W.D. Okla. 1993).
60. 463 U.S. 582 (1982).
61. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 595 (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946))
(emphasis added).
62. See id. at 595.
63. !d. at 597, n. 20 (emphasis added).
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ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. 64

The question of intent also arises under Title VII. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 65 the Supreme
Court held that disparate impact alone was insufficient to establish a Title VII violation. However, the Court held that disparate impact could be used as a basis for relief under Title VII
if the challenged practice was not based on a business necessity, or "if it lacked a manifest relationship to the employment
in question." 66
The leading case applying Title VII principles to a workplace sexual harassment claim is Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson. 67 In Meritor the Court held, for the first time, that hostile environment sexual harassment constitutes a form of sex
discrimination. As such, it is actionable under Title VII. This
conclusion is based on EEOC Guidelines that provide an "administrative interpretation of [Title VII] by the enforcing
agency." 68 The EEOC Guidelines assist the Court in "interpreting the Act's prohibition against discrimination based on
'sex."' 69
Relying on the language of Title VII, the Meritor Court held
that "[t]he phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in employment."70 Further, the Court accepted the Fifth Circuit's interpretation in Rogers v. EEOC, 71 that a Title VII cause of action goes beyond the potential economic impact caused by
workplace discrimination:
[T]he phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment'
in [Title VII] is an expansive concept which sweeps within its
protective ambit the practice of creating a working environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimina-

64. 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e- 2(a)(1) (1999).
65. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
66. Id. at 309.
67. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
68. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-434 (1971).
69. Meritor Savs. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63 (1986) (citing 100 Cong.
Rec. 2577-2584 at 2577 (1964)).
70. Id. (quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
707, n. 13 (1978)) (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F. 2d 1194, 1198 (7th
Cir. 1971)).
71. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
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tion .... One can readily envision working environments so
heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely
the emotional and psychological stability of minority group
workers .... 72

In Meritor, the Supreme Court extended the Rogers holding
by stating, "Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial
harassment is to racial equality."73
It is important to note that not all conduct that can be described as harassment, "affects a 'term, condition, or privilege'
of employment within the meaning of Title VII."74 To establish
a violation of Title VII for hostile environment sexual harassment, a plaintiff must prove both that the discrimination is
based on sex and that the discrimination created a hostile or
abusive work environment.
The Supreme Court, in Meritor, defined actionable sexual
harassment under Title VII to "be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and
create an abusive working environment."' 75 Further, actionable
sexual harassment requires the plaintiff to prove that the sexual advances are unwelcome.76
With regard to employer liability for hostile environment
sexual harassment, the Supreme Court declined to announce a
rule for employer liability. The Court did accept the EEOC's
conclusion that Congress intended courts to consider agency
principles in determining the employer's liability. 77
While the Supreme Court did not decide in Meritor what
the standard for employer liability will be, it did discuss the
concept of employer notice drawn from agency principles. Traditionally, employers are held liable for the discriminatory conduct of their supervisory personnel even where the employer
was unaware (knew or should have known) of the supervisor's
discriminatory conduct.
72.
73.
74.
75.

!d.

at 238.

Meritor, 477 U.S.
ld. at 67.
Meritor, 477 U.S.

at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (1982)).

at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (1982));
Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971).
76. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68, noted in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (1985).
77. "Congress' decision to define 'employer' to include any 'agent' of an employer,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible." Id. at 72.
See also
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The EEOC suggested an alternative standard for hostile
environment sexual harassment cases. That standard examines the availability of a complaint process, whether or not the
victim of sexual harassment utilized the procedure, and
whether or not the procedure was responsive to the victim's
complaint_78 Under the EEOC's rule, where an employer "has
an expressed policy against sexual harassment and has implemented a procedure specifically designed to resolve sexual harassment claims, and if the victim does not take advantage of
that procedure, the employer should be shielded from liability
absent actual knowledge of the sexually hostile environment."79 Otherwise, an employer will be liable only if "it has
actual knowledge of the harassment," 80 or there was "no reasonably available avenue for making his or her complaint
known to appropriate management officials." 81 The first applies where the employer has a complaint process that the victim does not use to report the harassment, thereby failing to
notify the employer of the discriminatory conduct. There, the
victim is at fault for failing to avail herself of the available
remedy. The second applies where the employer has no reporting procedure so the victim is unable to report the conduct.
The failure to report is not the victim's fault because the employer never informed potential victims of the reporting process.

Ill. PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT: IS THERE A PRIVATE CAUSE OF
ACTION UNDER TITLE IX?

Title IX provides that:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 82

As with each of the preceding federal statutes, it is necessary to determine under Title IX whether or not a private cause
of action exists before any remedies can be considered. The is-

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See id. at 71.
!d.
!d.
!d. at 71 (quoting Brief for United States and EEOC as Amici Curiae 26).
42 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a) (1999).
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sue of whether there is a private cause of action for student to
student sexual harassment has been considered several times
in the past three years, but the issue was far from being settled
until the May 1999, Supreme Court decision in Davis v. Monroe
County Board of Education. 83 While the Court held in Franklin
v. Gwinnett County Public Schools 84 that there is a private
cause of action under Title IX for teacher to student sexual
harassment, there had not been agreement that a Title IX
cause of action existed in cases involving student to student
sexual harassment until Davis.
There have been a few cases where courts have concluded
that a private cause of action exists for student to student hostile environment sexual harassment, 85 but there are other
cases on the subject where courts have not addressed the issue
of the existence of a private right of action. At least one court
concluded that there is no cause of action for student to student
sexual harassment. 86 In Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School
District, 87 the Fifth Circuit held that there is no cause of action
under Title IX "absent allegations that the school itself directly
discriminated based on sex." 88 Thus Rowinsky would apply the
Title VI standard requiring some connection between the alleged discrimination and the actions of school officials. 89 In
student to student sexual harassment cases, the Rowinsl?y
court concluded there is no such link because the harasser is
not a school district employee, and there is no power relationship between the harasser and the victim for which the school
83. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
84. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
85. See Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist., 32 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (D.N.H. 1997); Nicole
M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Collier v. William Penn Sch. Dist., 956 F. Supp. 1209 (E. D. Pa. 1997); Bruneau v. South Kortright
Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); Burrow v. Postville Community
Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Wright v. Mason City Community Sch.
Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F.
Supp. 1006 (W.D. Mo. 1995); Oona v. Santa Rosa City Sch., 890 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D.
Cal. 1995).
86. See Garza v. Galena Park Independent Sch. Dist., 914 F. Supp. 1437, 1438
(S.D. Tex. 1994) ("a student cannot bring a hostile environment claim under Title IX").
87. 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996) cert. denied, 519 U.S. 861 (1996). Title IX, student to student sexual harassment case holding that a school district cannot be held
liable under Title IX unless "the school district itself directly discriminated based on
sex." !d. at 1008.
88. Id. at 1006; See also, Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006
(W.D. Mo. 1995).
89. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1008.
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district could be held liable. In Doe v. Petaluma City School
District, 90 the court held that "no damages may be obtained
under Title IX (merely) for a school district's failure to take appropriate action in response to complaints of student to student
sexual harassment." 91 The Eleventh Circuit, in Davis v.
Monroe County Board of Education, 92 held that Franklin created a private cause of action for victims of teacher to student
sexual harassment, but not for student to student sexual harassment. Still other courts have resolved cases of student to
student sexual harassment without ever deciding whether or
not a cause of action exists. 93 Despite the hesitation among
lower courts to address the issue of a private cause of action
once and for all, courts in most Title IX cases involving peer
sexual harassment between students appear to accept the notion that there is a private cause of action under Title IX. The
conclusion that a Title IX cause of action exists is based on the
existence of private causes of action under Titles VI and VII. 94
Two issues, remnants of debates in Title VI and Title VII
cases, have created a great deal of confusion in peer sexual
harassment cases under Title IX involving public school students. The first issue is whether intentional discrimination is
required to establish a violation of Title IX for which a plaintiff
can recover money damages. The second issue revolves around
the role intent plays in determining the applicable standard of
liability for Title IX violations.95

90. 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
91. ld. at 1575.
92. 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997).
93. See Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226 (lOth Cir. 1996) (holding that the plaintiff
failed to state a claim for student to student sexual harassment); Murray v. New York
Univ. College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 250 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that even if Title IX
created a private cause of action for sexual harassment by a non-employee of the
school, Plaintiff failed to allege that school officials knew or should have known of the
harassment); and Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 54 F.3d 1447, 1452 (9th Cir. 1995),
(holding that a school counselor is entitled to qualified immunity).
94. See Nicole M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369, 1380 (N.D.
Cal. 1997). A female student reported being sexually harassed by male students in her
class. She sued the school district under Title IX alleging that the school district, a recipient of federal funds, discriminated against her on the basis of sex for failing to stop
the sexual harassment inflicted on her. In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.
677 (1979), the Supreme Court recognized "that Title IX clearly creates an enforceable
right."; Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992); Oona v. McCaffrey,
122F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 1997); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ , 120 F. 3d 1390
(11th Cir. 1997).
95. See Franklin v. Gwinnett Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992); Oona v. McCaffrey,
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A. Is Intent Required for Compensatory Relief?

There is less discussion of whether or not intent is required
to establish a violation of Title IX than there was for Title VI
and Title VII violations. Courts seem willing to accept the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court that in Title VI cases intent is required where a victim seeks money damages. 96 Once
it has been established that an institution has intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff, the court will award money
damages to compensate the plaintiff for injuries suffered as a
result of the intentionally discriminatory conduct of the schools
that are recipients of federal financial assistance. 97 This rule
was extended to Title IX cases in Cannon v. University of Chicago.98
The Supreme Court concluded in Cannon that Congress intended to create remedies under Title IX that were "comparable" to Title VI remedies because Title IX is modeled after Title
VI. 99 Therefore, absent a showing of intentional discrimination,
courts will award only declaratory and limited injunctive relief.IDO
The reason for restricting compensatory damages to cases
of intentional discrimination centers on the presence or absence of notice. If the recipient of federal funds is not a participant in the discriminatory conduct, as in cases of student to
student sexual harassment, then the recipient has no knowledge of the wrongful conduct and, therefore, lacks notice of the
violation. In such instances, the recipient should not be punished for behavior committed by others. No such notice exists
in cases of unintentional discrimination where the institution

122 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 1997); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390
(11th Cir. 1997); Nicole M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D. Cal.
1997).
96. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n of City of New York, 463 U.S. 582 (1983); Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481
(lOth Cir. 1996).
97. See id.
98. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
99. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-698 (1979) ("We have

no doubt that Congress wtended to create Title IX remedies comparable to those available under Title VI and that It understood Title V7 as authorizing an imp}jed p · t

;~~s~::.~~~~n (;~ v;;i~; oJ:i; prohibited discrimination.'). See Frankhn v. Gw1~::te

779 (3rd. Cir. 1990).·

'

(

~-

Pfeiffer v. Manon Center Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d

100. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,694-698 (1979).
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is unaware of any discrimination. 101 In those cases, courts
agree that institutions should not be held liable for discriminatory conduct of which they were unaware. 102
The rationale for this rule stems from the legislative history
of Title VI discussed at length in Guardians. 103 A contrary
ruling would frustrate the Congressional intent behind
Spending Clause legislation such as Titles VI and IX, and
might lead some institutions to refuse to accept federal funds.
In Title IX cases, intentional discrimination by recipients of
federal funds establishes proof that the recipient had knowledge that discriminatory conduct had occurred. This knowledge
stems from the active participation of the recipient in the discriminatory conduct. That is the type of conduct Congress intended to punish by imposing compensatory damages for intentional discrimination.

B. The role of Intent
The rule regarding notice to recipients of federal financial
assistance in a Title IX context was further explained by the
Eleventh Circuit in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education.104 In Davis, the court stated that "an enactment under
the Spending Clause must unambiguously disclose to would-be
recipients all facts material to their decision to accept Title IX
funding." 105 The Davis court concluded that the legislative history of Title IX contains no indication that Congress gave
school districts and teachers "clear notice" that by accepting
federal funds they also "would accept responsibility for remedying student-student sexual harassment." 106
The Eleventh Circuit's ruling in Davis appeared to foreclose
suits against school districts for student to student sexual harassment on the ground that the legislative history contains no
notice to school districts that they are subject to liability for
101. But see Nicole M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369, 1378
(N.D. Cal. 1997) (where the court stated that the knew or should have known standard
"requires actual notice or a severity or pervasiveness of harassing conduct that would
ordinarily create notice.").
102. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of the City of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582
(1983); Wright v. Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412 (N.D. Iowa
1996).
103. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 602.
104. 120 F. 3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997).
105. ld. at 1406.
106. Id.
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peer sexual harassment between students. If the Davis approach were adopted by other courts, peer sexual harassment
suits involving students as harasser and victim would be virtually eliminated as an avenue toward a potential remedy for
student victims of peer sexual harassment. But recently some
courts have questioned this conclusion, arguing instead that
the language of Title IX gives notice to recipients of federal
funds to maintain an institution free of discrimination. Therefore, school districts may be held liable for their actions and inactions in response to complaints of sexual harassment because
Title IX states that recipients of federal funds are on notice to
maintain an environment free from discrimination. Inaction after a student complains to a school official constitutes notice of
discriminatory conduct. Failure to act in order to end the discrimination is equivalent to deliberate indifference, which constitutes discriminatory intent_l07
IV. STANDARDS OF LIABILITY FOR PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT

The issue of intent is closely tied to the determination of the
applicable standard of liability for sexual harassment generally. Which standard is applicable, under Title IX though, has
not been quite as clear-cut in cases of student to student sexual
harassment.
In the Title IX hostile environment sexual harassment
cases, proof of intent may be inferred from the totality of circumstances108 or from "cumulative evidence of action and inaction which objectively manifests discriminatory intent." 109
While courts readily accept that intentional discrimination is
required in Title IX hostile environment sexual harassment
cases to hold school districts liable, it was not settled, prior to
1999, what was required to prove an intent to discriminate in

107. See Haines v. Metropolitan Gov't of Davidson County, 32 F. Supp. 2d 991
(M.D. Tenn. 1998).
108. See Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1205 (N.D.
Iowa 1996) ("including evidence of the school's failure to prevent or stop the sexual
harassment despite actual knowledge of the sexually harassing behavior of students
over whom the school exercised some degree of control.").
109. Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1020 (W.D. Mo. 1995).
Jennifer Bosley and other female students were sexually harassed by male students.
Bosley asserted that the school district failed to protect the female students from sexual harassment and discrimination and therefore, had intentionally discriminated
against her by excluding her from participation in a federally funded program.
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Title IX cases. 110 That raised the question of what standard of
liability should be applied to hostile environment sexual harassment cases, particularly cases of student to student sexual
harassment.
A. Application of Title VI Standard in Title IX Cases

The Title VI standard is known as the "intentional discrimination" or "strict liability" standard. As applied to student
sexual harassment cases arising under Title IX, this standard
requires proof that the school district had actual or constructive111 knowledge of the harassing behavior; and that despite
that knowledge, school officials took no action to remedy the
sexual harassment. 112 This standard differs from the Title VII
standard on the element of notice. The Title VI standard is frequently interpreted to require actual knowledge of sexual harassment.113 But some courts have required victims of sexual
harassment to establish that, in addition to actual knowledge
of harassment, the school district intentionally failed to act to
stop the harassment.11 4
The two-pronged Title VI standard is meant to hold institutions liable only where it is clear that the institution had direct
knowledge of the illegal conduct, and further, participated in
the illegal conduct by purposely (or intentionally) taking no action to stop the misconduct. Where sexual harassment is perpetrated by a student against another student, it is difficult to
prove that the school district had actual knowledge of the har110. See Wright v. Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412 (N.D.
Iowa 1996). A female student was verbally harassed by other female students after she
had been raped by her ex-boyfriend. The question in this case was whether a student
could recover damages from a school district for its failure to stop sexual harassment of
which they were aware and whether that failure to remedy constituted intentional dis·
crimination by the school district.
111. The constructive knowledge standard is also referred to as the knew or should
have known standard.
112. See Nelson v. Almont Community Sch., 931 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Mich. 1996);
Oona v. Santa Rosa City Sch., 890 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Howard v. Board of
Educ., 876 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Letlow v. Evans, 857 F. Supp. 676 (W.D. Mo.
1994); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993); Floyd v.
Waiters, 831 F. Supp. 867 (M.D. Ga. 1993); R. L. R. v. Prague Pub. Sch. Dist. I-103, 838
F. Supp. 1526 (W.D. Okla. 1993).
113. See Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162, 169-174
(N.D.N.Y 1996) (holding that constructive notice is insufficient to establish school district liability).
114. See Wright v. Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp 1412 (N.D. Iowa
1996).
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assment because no employee, over whom the school district
has supervisory authority, has sexually discriminated against a
student.
Before 1997, the Title VI standard was rarely invoked in
sexual harassment cases occurring in the school setting. Then
in 1997, several courts had the opportunity to consider what
standard of liability should be applied in Title IX student to
student sexual harassment cases. 115 The courts had to determine if the requisite level of intent was present to justify
holding a school district liable for the misconduct. In those
cases, courts began to back away from the predominant view
that Title VII standards governed the Title IX sexual harassment cases. Two significant opinions suggest that a new standard will be applied in future Title IX student to student sexual
harassment cases. Those cases will be discussed in detail in the
final section. 11 6

B. Application of Title VII Principles to Title IX Cases
Many of the courts responding to student to student sexual
harassment have applied Title VII principles in Title IX cases
because they believed they were following Franklin and Meritor.l17 This reliance on Franklin and Meritor has been criticized in recent cases, 118 primarily because Title VII is aimed at
discrimination in the workplace, not discrimination against
students. Title VII controls the employer/employee relationship
with regard to sex discrimination based on agency principles.
Recently courts have agreed that the Title VII standard has no
applicability in student to student sexual harassment cases because there is no agency relationship between the student har-

115. See Rosa H. v. San Elisario, Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 656 (5th Cir.
1997); Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist., 128 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 1997); Davis v. Monroe
County Sch. Bd., 120 F. 3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997).
116. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999); Gebser v. Lago
Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
117. See Wright v. Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412 (N.D.
Iowa 1996); Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162 (N.D.N.Y.
1996); Nelson v. Almont Community Sch. Dist., 931 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Mich. 1996);
Burrow v. Postville Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Linson v. Trustees
of the Univ. of Pa., No. 95-3681, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12243 (E.D. Pa. August 21,
1996).
118. See Doe v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir. 1997); Nicole
M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
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asser and school officials upon which school district liability
could be based_l19 Yet Title VII principles have guided the law
in this area in recent years.
Meritor, and later Franklin, helped pave the way to our
current understanding of the parameters of a Title VII violation. From Meritor came the language, "discrimination based
on sex," 12 0 which helped us understand what behavior "create[s] a hostile or abusive work environment." 121 In Franklin,
the Supreme Court extended the reach of the Meritor language
when it applied the "discrimination based on sex" 122 requirement to incidents of "sexual harassment of a student by a
teacher." 123 Meritor also has been applied to cases of peer sexual harassment in the workplace, 124 while Franklin has been
extended to include student to student sexual harassment. 125
119. See Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist., 128 F.3d 1014, 1023 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Ti·
tie IX prohibits recipients of funds for a 'program or activity' from discriminating on
the basis of sex, while Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of
sex .... " ld at 1027); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1396 (11th
Cir. 1997) ("The term 'hostile environment' sexual harassment originated in employment litigation under section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Public Law No. 88·
352, 78 STAT. 241, 255 (1964) (Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000 E-2 (1994))("Title VII").
Hostile-environment sexual harassment occurs whenever an employee's speech or con·
duct creates an atmosphere that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter another em·
ployee's working conditions."); Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F. Supp. 64, 72
(D.N.H. 1997) ("In at least one case of a student-employee who was harassed, the first
circuit has concluded that Title VII principles apply to Title IX cases. See Lipsett, 864
F.2d at 896-97. However, in that case the circuit explicitly limited its ruling to the facts
before it and gave no indication that its analysis could be extended to other Title IX
cases absent an employer-employee relationship." Citing Lipsett v. University of P.R.,
864 F.2d 881, 897 (1st Cir. 1988)).
120. Meritor Savs. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
121. ld.
122. ld.
123. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992).
124. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). Ellison is a Title VII coworker sexual harassment case where a male employee persistently pursued a personal relationship with a female co-worker over her objections. There were two questions raised in this case. First, the court had to determine the appropriate test to determine when "conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter conditions of
employment and create a hostile working environment." Id. at 873. Second, what remedial actions can an employer take to shield itself from liability.
125. See Nicole M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369, 1375 (N.D.
Cal 1997). "[T]he Franklin court turned to Title VII Jaw to determine what standard
should apply to Title IX sexual harassment claims. The court held: 'unquestionably,
Title IX placed on [defendant school system] the duty not to discriminate on the basis
of sex, and 'when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex.' Quoting Meritor Savs.
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).' We believe the same rule should apply
when a teacher sexually harasses a student." Id. (quoting Franklin v. Gwinnett County
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From the Title VII case law came the notion of employer liability when the employer "knew or should have known" of the
sexually harassing behavior, and the employer fails "to take
steps reasonably calculated to end the harassment."126 In Nicole M. u. Martinez Unified School District, 127 a California district court added to the confusion over the applicability of Title
VII principles to Title IX cases when the court stated that the
"knew or should have known" standard is consistent with
"Pennhurst's explanation of the contractual nature of Spending
Clause legislation, Justice White's opinion in Guardians and
the Franklin decision." 128 The California court seems to combine Title VI and Title VII standards in Nicole M. with the
court's reliance on Pennhurst 12 9 and Spending Clause legislation to explain the Title VII "knew or should have known"
standard. Ultimately, the court held that "Title IX does not impose liability on school districts for peer hostile environment
sexual harassment 'absent allegations that the school district
itself directly discriminated based on sex."'130 The Nicole M.
test requires proof "that an employee who has been invested by
the school board with supervisory power over the offending
employee actually knew of the abuse, had the power to end the
abuse, and failed to do so."131
It appears that Nicole M. would extend Title VII agency
principles to cases of peer sexual harassment between students. This would hold school district officials liable for peer to
peer sexual harassment where school officials had been notified
of the harassing conduct. The court extended the agency relationship found in the employment context to the relationship
between teacher and school district in peer sexual harassment
cases involving students. The Nicole M. court explained:
Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992)). Reworded to apply to students it would read: When
[one student] sexually harasses [another student] because of the [student's] sex, that
[student] discriminate[s] on the basis of sex.
126. Nicole M., 964 F. Supp. at 1376 (citing Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d. 872, 881-82
(9th Cir. 1991); See also Davis v. Monroe County Bd. ofEduc., 74 F.3d 1186, 1193 (11th
Cir. 1996) vacated, pending reh'g en bane, 91 F.3d 1418 (11th Cir. 1996).
127. !d. at 1369.
128. !d. at 1378 (both Pennhnrst and Guardians were Title VI cases while Franklin was a Title IX case).
129. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hasp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
130. Nicole M., 964 F. Supp. at 1376 (quoting Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist.,
80 F.3d 1006, 1008 (5th Cir. 1996).
131. !d. at 1377 (quoting Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648,
650 (5th Cir. 1997).
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A teacher whose agency status is sufficient to hold the district
liable for her harassment of a student, which was the case in
Franklin, stands in no different position when she knows, or
should be on notice with the exercise of reasonable care, of
peer sexual harassment. Given the relationship of teachers to
students and the duties that inhere in that relationship, this
is a reasonable application of Franklin.132

Title VII principles have been applied to sexual harassment
cases arising in the school context. Until recently, factors generated by the Eleventh Circuit in Davis 133 have been applied to
determine school district liability. 134 The five factors defined in
Davis represented a compilation of existing Title VII guidelines
used to determine if hostile environment sexual harassment
existed in the workplace. In Davis, the district court applied
those factors to determine if the harassing conduct established
proof of intentional misconduct by school districts in violation
ofTitle IX.
The first factor, "she belongs to a protected group," 135 is a
preliminary question to ensure that the victim actually falls
within the protection of Title IX. The second factor, "she was
subject to unwelcome sexual harassment," 136 as well as the
third factor, "the harassment was based on sex" are both derived from Meritor Savings Bank FSB v. Vinson. 137 The second
factor requires the victim to show that the sexual conduct was
not welcome. This is not difficult to prove when the harasser is
a teacher and the victim is a student, unless the student is in
high school and there is evidence that both teacher and student
took steps to conceal the relationship. 138 It is less difficult to
132. !d. at 1378.
133. 74 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1996).
134. !d. at 1194 ("1) Plaintiff is a member of a protected group; 2) Plaintiff was
subject to unwelcome harassment; 3) harassment was based on sex; 4) sexual harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to unreasonably alter the conditions of
her education and create an abusive educational environment; 5) some basis for institutional liability has been established.") See also Wright v. Mason City Community
Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp 1412, 1419-1420 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (In Wright, the court added
the following to the existing fifth factor: "and intentionally failed to take the proper
remedial measures because of the plaintiffs sex." 940 F. Supp. at 1419); Bosley v.
Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1022-1023 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (The Bosley
court changed the fifth factor to read: "The defendant knew or should have known of
harassment and failed to take proper remedial action." 904 F. Supp. at 1022-23.).
135. Harris v. Forklift, 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
136. Dauis, 74 F. 3d at 1194.
137. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
138. See Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist., 128 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 1997); Marsh v.
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show the unwelcomeness of sexual conduct when both harasser
and victim are students, particularly when the behavior interferes with the victim's ability to participate in the educational
environment. This is especially true when the behavior interferes with the victim's ability to participate in the educational
environment.
The factor that has created the most uncertainty is the
third factor: "the harassment was based on sex." Some courts
have required victims to show that the school district treated
boys differently than it treated girls. 139 But this interpretation
has been criticized by some courts that have adopted a less restrictive interpretation of intent. For example, one district
court concluded that "to be held liable, a school district must
have intended to create a hostile environment for the plaintiff."140
The fourth Davis factor incorporates the Harris v. Forklift
requirement that the harassing conduct must be "sufficiently
severe or pervasive so as to alter conditions of her education."141 This factor protects the institution from liability when
the harassing conduct is not so serious as to interfere with the
victim's education. This factor is explicitly designed to protect
school districts from liability for "simple horseplay" 142 that
merely annoys the victim.
The fifth Davis factor requires the victim to show "that
some basis of institutional liability" exists. 143 The Davis court
clearly intended to apply the Title VII agency standard of liability under Title IX with the adoption of the fifth (basis of institutionalliability). As applied, the fifth Davis factor requires

Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 3:94-CV-2255-R, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4819 (N.D. Tex.
March 10, 1997); Kimpton v. School Dist. of New Lisbon, 138 Wis.2d 226 (Wis. App.
1987).
139. See Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F. 3d 1006, 1016 (5th Cir. 1996).
140. Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F. Supp. 64, 74 (D.N.H. 1997). See also
Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1421 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Burrow v.
Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp 1193, 1205 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
141. Harris v. Forklift, 510 U.S. 17, 18 (1993). See also Kinman v. Omaha Sch.
Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 468 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1232
(lOth Cir. 1996)).
142. Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162, 175 (N.D.N.Y.
1996). See also Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 575, cert. granted, vacated 118 S.
Ct 1183 (1998); McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F. 3d 1191, 1199
(4th Cir. 1996) (Michael, J., dissenting).
143. Kinman v. Omaha Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 468 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Seamons
v. Snow, 84 F. 3d 1226, 1232 (lOth Cir. 1996)).
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that the school district: "a) knew or should have known of the
harassment; and b) failed to take prompt remedial action."l 44
From 1993 through 1996, many lower courts struggled to
define the standard of liability that should be imposed on
school districts for peer sexual harassment. The growing trend
was to move away from the Title VI strict liability standard requiring either actual knowledge of sexual harassment or a hostile environment to prove intentional discrimination by a school
district, 145 in favor of the two-pronged, Title VII approach requiring that an employer or officials of an institution "knew or
should have known of the sexual harassment and failed to take
remedial action."l46
The problem with the Title VII standard, despite the apparent clarity of the Davis factors, is that Title VII was adopted
as a means of combating employment discrimination. Adoption
of the "knew or should have known" standard, while a seemingly appropriate application of Title VII principles in Title IX
sexual harassment cases to determine school officials' intent to
discriminate against victims of sexual harassment, has recently been challenged in a series of cases. 147 The Title VII
standard is inapplicable to Title IX cases, according to recent
courts, because Title VII liability depends on an agency relationship between the institution and the victim and/or the harasser. That agency relationship does not exist in student to
student sexual harassment cases primarily because there is no
relationship between the school district and the harasser such
that the school district could have notice of the sexual harassment or hostile environment arising from an institution/harasser relationship. The harasser does not act on behalf
of the school district or in the scope of any employment. Therefore, there is no basis for liability against the school district.
The end result is that those courts that have carefully
looked at the legislative history of Title VII have concluded
144. Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193 (N.D. Iowa
1996); See Nicole v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369, 1376 (N. D. Cal.
1997).
145. See Id.; Nelson v. Almont Community Scb., 931 F. Supp. 1345, 1355 (E.D.
Mich. 1996); Bolon v. Rolla Pub. Sch., 917 F. Supp. 1423, 1427 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
146. Id.; Nelson v. Almont Community Sch., 931 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Mich. 1996);
Pallett v. Palma, 914 F. Supp. 1018, 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
147. See Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 655-656 (5th Cir.
1997); Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist., 128 F.3d 1014, 1033-34 (7th Cir. 1997); Davis
v. Monroe County Bd. ofEduc., 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997).

47]

SAME-GENDER SEXUAL HARASSMENT

77

that Title VII principles do not apply to school districts for student to student sexual harassment. This conclusion calls into
question all of the rulings that have applied the Title VII standard to cases of peer sexual harassment between students. It
also opens the door for other courts to reconsider the whole notion of school district liability for student to student sexual
harassment.

V. SAME-GENDER SEXUAL HARASSMENT BETWEEN PEERS: A
NEW DIRECTION

Arguments against application of the Title VII standard in
Title IX sexual harassment cases have resurfaced with new
strength in the last two years. 148 Two cases, in particular,
comprehensively analyze why the application of the Title VII
standard in student to student sexual harassment cases is inappropriate and imposes an undue burden on school districts.149 At the core of this new line of cases is the proposition
that Title IX differs significantly from Title VII such that application of Title VII agency principles to Title IX cases cannot
be supported by the legislative histories of either statute.
The shift began in earnest with Rosa H. v. San Elizario Independent School District. 150 In Rosa H., the Fifth Circuit rejected the agency theory of liability (or vicarious liability) 151 in
favor of the stricter "actual knowledge" standard. But the court
added a new element. Under Rosa H. "school districts are not
liable in tort for teacher-student harassment under Title IX
unless an employee who has been invested by the school board
with supervisory power over the offending employee actually
knew of the abuse, had the power to end the abuse, and failed to
148. See Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997);
Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist., 128 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 1997); Davis v. Monroe
County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997); Floyd v. Waiters, 831 F. Supp.
867, 876 (M.D. Ga. 1993).
149. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997);
Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist., 128 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 1997).
150. 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997) (involving teacher to student sexual harassment
under Title IX. The question here was whether a school district could be held liable for
its failure to prevent teacher to student sexual harassment.).
151. See also Doe v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir. 1997)
("Common law rule is that an employer is vicariously liable for the tort of an employee,
even if the tort was outside of the scope of employment, if the employee 'was aided in
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relationship."' Quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency§ 219(2) (d) (1958)).
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do so."152 The Fifth Circuit rejected the common law agency
theory of liability for teacher to student harassment in Rosa H.
and then further retreated from the Title VII agency theory of
liability in Doe v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 153
stating that "[w]e follow Rosa H. and refuse to allow plaintiffs
to use Title IX which was enacted under the Spending Clause,
to bring suits based on the mere fact that a teacher's employment status aided in the commission of sexual harassment." 154
The Fifth Circuit again took the lead in shaping the law in the
sexual harassment arena with these two cases. Doe v. Lago
Vista Independent School District marked a return to the discussion of the proper basis upon which liability for sexual harassment should rest. It also marked a return to a discussion of
the legislative intent behind Title IX. That led, ultimately, to
the Fifth Circuit's conclusion in Davis v. Monroe County Board
of Education that "Title IX is virtually identical to Title VI." 155
But the court refused to impose liability for student to student
harassment because "Congress gave no clear notice to schools
and teachers that they, rather than society as a whole, would
accept responsibility for remedying student-student sexual
harassment when they chose to accept federal financial assistance under Title IX." 156 The lack of notice, coupled with the
absence of any connection between the school and the actions of
the student harasser, compelled courts to absolve school districts of liability for peer sexual harassment between students.
In August 1997, the Seventh Circuit continued the discussion of school district liability for student to student sexual
harassment under Title IX. In Smith v. Metropolitan School
District, 157 the Seventh Circuit explained, "while Title VII and
Title IX both prohibit sexual harassment as a form of sex dis152. Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 650 (emphasis added).
153. 106 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir. 1997).
154. ld. at 1226.
155. Davis, 120 F. 3d at 1398.
156. Id. at 1406.
157. 128 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 1997). This is a Title IX case where a student sought
damages against the school district for discrimination based on sex stemming from a
sexual affair between a student and her teacher. The court concluded that Title VII
provides guidance in determining "whether the alleged harassment is severe and pervasive enough to constitute illegal discrimination on the basis of sex for purposes of
Title IX." I d. at 1023. The Smith Court rejected Title VII agency principles as the basis
for the standard of liability applicable to instances of institutional discrimination based
on sex. The court adopted the actual knowledge standard set forth in Rosa H. v. San
Elizario Independent School District, 106 F. 3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997).
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crimination, the statutes differ as to who is prohibited from engaging in that conduct." 158 The court went on to compare the
language of the two statutes to determine if Congress intended
Title VII to guide the application of Title IX in sexual harassment cases. A fundamental difference between Title VII and
Title IX is that "Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of sex," 159 while "Title IX prohibits recipients of funds for a 'program or activity' from discriminating on
the basis of sex." 16°
In Meritor, the Supreme Court held that agency principles
apply to Title VII "because the statutes at issue explicitly define an employee to include agents of the employer, evincing
Congress' intent to hold employers liable vicariously." 161 As a
result, the Meritor Court concluded that "the 'any agent' language of Title VII ... provides a statutory basis for applying
agency principles" 162 to sexual harassment claims.
Title IX contains no language creating a "statutory basis for
applying agency principles." 163 The language of Title IX excludes from liability employees working for a "program or activity" and includes "only those who have administrative control of the school." 164 Clearly, teachers are excluded under this
definition of "program or activity" because teachers don't have
administrative control of the school. But the question often confronting courts in sexual harassment cases is who has administrative control of the school? Is it the school principal, the superintendent, or the school board? The typical response is that
the school board has administrative control of the school. 165
Therefore, unless a victim can prove that the school board has
either actual or constructive knowledge of sexual harassment
and then fails to take remedial action, the school board will not
be held liable for sexual harassment that occurs in public
schools. If this new approach to the standard of liability, based
158. Smith, 128 F.3d at 1023 (emphasis added).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. ld. at 1024.
162. ld.
163. Id.
164. ld.
165. See Karen Michaelis, Theories of Liability for the Sexual Misconduct of Teachers, VOL 6. No. 5 J. SCH. LEADERSHIP 540-554 (Sept. 1996) for a discussion of which
school officials must have knowledge of abuse and fail to act for liability to attach to
school districts in teacher sexual abuse cases.
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on Title VI principles, becomes the accepted approach in peer
sexual harassment cases, 166 and Title IX restricts liability only
to "the acts of the recipients of federal funds," 167 then student
victims of peer sexual harassment will be unable to seek damages against a school district for its failure to prevent or stop
student to student sexual harassment. 168
In light of the almost identical language of Title VI and Title IX, coupled with the recent emphasis on using the legislative history of Title VI to determine the correct standard under
Title IX; it is likely that the element of institutional notice not
only will become more central in determining the standard of
school district liability, but it will also completely foreclose application of Title VII agency principles in Title IX cases. This
will further insulate school districts from liability for student to
student sexual harassment. 169 The result is not far from becoming reality.

VI. RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS: ONCALE, GEBSER,
AND DAVIS

A. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.
Recently, the Supreme Court recognized a private cause of

166. It appears that the Supreme Court has adopted this approach in Gebser u.
Lago Vista Independent School District, 524 U.S. 274 (1998) and Davis u. Monroe
County Board of Education, 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997).
167. Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. Perry Township, 128 F.3d 1014, 1026 (7th
Cir. 1997) (quoting Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 654 (5th
Cir. 1997).
168. Students will not have recourse under Title IX for student to student sexual
harassment unless courts consider the inaction of recipients of federal funds as discriminatory conduct thereby attaching liability to school districts for their own conduct
in ignoring sexual harassment by third parties. See Haines v. Metropolitan Gov't of
Davidson County, 32 F. Supp. 2d 991, 998 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) ("writing the four-person
dissent, Judge Barkett [in Davis] rejected the reasoning of ,Judge Tjoflat's majority
opinion, concluding that Title IX provides unambiguous notice to recipients of federal
funds that they many be liable for failing to remedy the sexual harassment of one student by other students") (citing Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F. 3d 1390,
1412 (11th Cir. 1997) (Barkett, J., dissenting)).
169. Title IX liability for student to student sexual harassment requires a link between the school district and the harasser. "[Tjhe policy concerns involved in Spending
Clause legislation compel the conclusion that agency principles have no place in Title
IX litigation because 'there is nothing to give notice to the recipient of federal funds
that the funds carry the strings of such liability."' Smith, 128 F.3d at 1031 (quoting
Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F. 3d 648, 656 (5th Cir 1997)).
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action under Title VII for same-gender sexual harassment between co-workers. In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
Inc., 170 the Supreme Court had the opportunity to consider the
issue of employer liability in a same-gender sexual harassment
case. The Court concluded that under Title VII agency principles, the acts of an employee may be imputed to the employer
where the employer had notice of the sexual harassment and
failed to prevent or stop the behavior creating the hostile environment. The Court clearly demonstrated the link in Oncale
between the harassing behavior and the employer's responsibility to maintain a nondiscriminatory workplace. The Court
also made clear that Title VII applies to sexual harassment in
the workplace. While this decision is important because it clarifies, at least for adult co-workers that same-gender sexual harassment between peers is actionable under Title VII, it leaves
unanswered the question whether a student victim of peerinflicted sexual harassment may recover damages from a
school district. The Oncale decision also raises a question regarding the Supreme Court's intent to create different standards for sexual harassment between adult co-workers and
sexual harassment between students.
In Oncale, the Court seemed to have provided a way for
lower courts to avoid attaching liability to school districts for
student to student sexual harassment while providing a clear
message that employers may be held liable under Title VII for
same-gender peer sexual harassment between co-workers.
Therefore, adult workers would be protected from their coworkers' sexual harassment, while students would continue to
have no remedy against the school district where student to
student harassment occurs. While this result is the logical conclusion of the statutory analysis of Titles VI, VII, and IX, its
practical application is bound to leave many parents and students baffled and angry that Title VII would protect adult victims of same-gender, peer sexual harassment, but not student
victims of same-gender, peer sexual harassment.

B. Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District 171 illustrates the Court's willingness to abandon the Title VII stan170. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
171. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).

82

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2000

dard relied on by lower courts to determine school district liability for sexual harassment. This shift clarifies the standard
of liability for sexual harassment in the workplace outside of
educational institutions. It also clarifies the standard of liability for sexual harassment in schools. Moreover, this shift aligns
the rationale for applying the Title VI standard in school sexual harassment cases with the legislative history of Title IX recently analyzed in student to student sexual harassment cases.
This shift also retains the Title VII standard for sexual harassment perpetrated by a school district employee against another employee, but not where an employee sexually harasses a
student. In an unusual move, the Supreme Court concluded
that even teacher to student sexual harassment will be governed by the Title VI standard.l 72
Yet to be answered is the question, what are the limits of
liability? The answer to this question hinges on the notice and
action elements already explored extensively in earlier sexual
harassment cases applying Title VII or Section 1983 standards.
Specifically, school district liability will depend on a) what constitutes sufficient notice to the school district that peer sexual
harassment is occurring; and b) what action is the school district required to take to end the harassment. 173
In Gebser, the Supreme Court articulated a new standard of
liability based on the stricter Title VI standard. There the
Court stated:
[D]amages may not be recovered [from a school district based
on sexual harassment of a student by one of its teachers] unless an official of the school district who at a minimum has
172. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist, 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (concluding
that "it would 'frustrate the purposes' of Title IX to permit a damages recovery against
a school district for a teacher's sexual harassment of a student based on principles of
respondeat superior or constructive notice.") (quoting Franklin v. Gwinnett County
Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 71 (1992); See also Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. Township,
128 F.3d 1014, 1027 (7th Cir. 1997) ("rejecting agency standard of institutional liability
in Title IX cases") (quoting Morse v. Regents of the U niv. of Colo., 154 F.3d 1124, 1127
(lOth Cir. 1998)).
173. See Haines v. Metropolitan Gov't of Davidson County, 32 F. Supp. 2d 991
(M.D. Tenn. 1998). A female student was sexually harassed and sexually abused by two
male students at school. The female student sought damages from the school board for
their failure to stop the harassment. The court applied the recently adopted Gebser
standard limiting a damage remedy under Title IX to cases where "an official who at a
minimum has authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the recipient's behalf has actual knowledge of discrimination in the
recipient's programs and fails adequately to respond." ld. at 999 (quoting Gebser v.
Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 292 (1998).
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authority to institute corrective measures on the district's behalf has actual notice of, and is deliberately indifferent to, the
teacher's misconduct_l74
The higher standard for teacher to student sexual harassment does not square with the rationale offered by the Court
justifying Title VI as the appropriate standard in the educational institution when the school district is governed by the
lower Title VII standard for employee-employee sexual harassment because of the agency relationship between the district and the perpetrator. That agency relationship does not
disappear when the victim is a student. The result, however, is
to make it even more difficult for students to establish school
district liability even where teachers are the perpetrators.
The Gebser standard severely restricts a student's ability to
recover damages from a school district, particularly in cases
where the student alleges that the school district failed to protect the student from sexual harassment inflicted by another
student. Post-Gebser courts will have to help clarify the components of the Gebser standard. As it stands, it is not clear which
school officials have "authority to institute corrective measures
on the district's behal£." 175 Additionally, it is not clear if that
authority is something more than simply being an employee of
the school district who knows the chain of command for reporting such things as child abuse and sexual harassment.l76
The notice element of the Gebser standard will continue to be
debated. The questions are, how many reports of sexual harassment are necessary to establish actual notice, and which official of the school district must be informed in order to satisfy
the actual notice prong?
The real surprise in Gebser was the adoption of the deliberate indifference element from Section 1983, first mentioned in
Nicole M., to the Gebser standard. Deliberate indifference has
created problems in Section 1983 cases in two ways. First, how
much action is enough to indicate that a school district is attempting to resolve a sexual harassment complaint? Second,

174. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284.
175. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284.
176. See Haines, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 999 (noting that child abuse reporting statutes
make teachers mandatory reporters of suspected child abuse, but courts considering
school district liability for sexual harassment by another student or even a teacher
have been reluctant to conclude that a classroom teacher is vested with sufficient
authority to "institute corrective measures") (quoting Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284).
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how effective must the action be, if at all, to overcome a charge
of deliberate indifference? To date, there are no definitive answers to either of these questions.
Further, as the stricter Title VI standard is applied to
same-gender sexual harassment cases where both harasser and
victim are students, the conflict between the current state of
the law and the expectation held by parents and students that
school officials will protect students from sexual harassment
will lead to more conflict over who will be held liable for the
damage caused by hostile environment sexual harassment in
public schools.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Davis, several issues remained unresolved concerning a school district's potential for liability in cases of student to student sexual harassment.177 First, would the Court recognize a private cause of
action for student to student sexual harassment? And second, if
a cause of action were recognized, what standard of liability
would be imposed on school districts for student to student
sexual harassment? The recent movement away from the Title
VII standard by lower courts indicated a growing acceptance of
Title VI as the appropriate standard of liability in Title IX
cases. Prior to Gebser, it was not clear that the Supreme Court
would agree with that emerging minority view in determining
school district liability for student to student sexual harassment. However, one of the remaining issues sure to cause debate concerns a determination of which school officials "ha[ve]
authority to institute corrective measures on the district's behalf."178 Some have argued recently that a classroom teacher
should be considered to have such authority when a student is
victimized by another student. 179
177. The Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education,
526 U.S. 629 (1999), addressed several of the questions that had been debated among
the lower courts without definitive resolution. The Davis decision has laid to rest the
debate over the existence of a private cause of action for student to student sexual harassment holding that there is a private cause of action for student to student sexual
harassment. The Court also identified the appropriate standard of liability under Title
IX for student to student sexual harassment when it adopted the Title VI standard. I d.
178. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 284 (1998).
179. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytech Inst., 132 F.3d 949, 958 (4th Cir. 1997),
reh'g en bane granted, vacated (Feb. 5, 1998); Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80
F.3d 1006, 1015 (5th Cir.) cert. Denied, 519 U.S. 861 (1996); Kinman v. Omaha Pub.
Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 467-68 (8th Cir. 1996); Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1232
(lOth Cir. 1996); Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, Inc., 68 F. 3d 525, 540 (1st
Cir. 1995); See also Oona v. McCaffrey, 143 F.3d 473, 476 (9th Cir 1998); Doe v. Clai-
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Several post-Gebser cases have adopted the stricter Gebser
Title VI standard in both teacher to student and student to
student sexual harassment cases. 180 But, despite Gebser, questions remain. One issue sure to occupy the courts for some time
concerns the circumstances under which school districts will be
held liable for sexual harassment under Title IX, particularly
when the harasser is not an employee of the school district.
During 1998, before and after Gebser was decided, several
lower courts considered the scope and meaning of Title IX in
cases of student to student sexual harassment. 181 Those courts
agreed with Judge Barkett's dissent in the Eleventh Circuit's
decision in Davis 182 "that Title IX authorizes a cause of action
for student-on-student sexual harassment." 183Further, the
Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits agree that while employers and school officials cannot be held "vicariously liable for the
actions of others," 184 all three circuits agree that Title IX imposes on educational institutions the duty to maintain an educational environment free of discrimination. As such, the educational institution would be required to "safeguardO
individual students' rights."l85
borne County Tenn., 103 F.3d 495, 515 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting "the elements to state a
supervisory hostile environment claim under Title VII equally apply to Title IX");
Murray v. New York Univ. College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 248 (2d Cir. 1995) ("using
Title VII legal standards to review claim of discrimination under Title IX") (quoting
Haines, 32 F. Supp. 2d 999); Haines v. Metropolitan Gov't of Davidson County, 32 F.
Supp.2d 991, 999 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) ("applying Title VII standards to Title IX hostile
environment claim").
1~0. See X v. Fremont County Sch. Dist., 162 F.3d 1175 (lOth Cir 1998) (noting
that [t]he Supreme Court has ruled that Title VII's employer liability principles do not
apply m the T1tle IX context.") (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283); Morse v. Regents of the
~mv. of Colo., 154 F.3d 1124 (lOth Cir. 1998); see also Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 78G
( lth C1r. 1998) (pre-Gebser case adopting Title VI standard)· Smith
Mt
r
Sch. Dist. Perry Township, 128 F.3d 1014 1027 (7th CJ·r ,1997) (pv. Gebropo Itan
d ·
·
'
·
re- e ser case

a optmg Title VI standard); Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648
(5th Clr. 1997) (pre-Gebser case adopting Title VI standard)· Davis v DeKalb c t
Sch · Dist·· 996 F· s upp. 1478 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (pre-Gebser case
' adopting
· Title VI oun
stany.
dard).
181. See Haines v. Metropolitan Gov't of Davidson County, 32 F. Supp. 2d. 991
(M.D. Tenn. 1998); Oona v. McCaffrey, 143 F.3d 473 (9th Cir. 1998)· Brzonkala v· .
g1ma Polytech Inst., 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997); Doe v. University ~fIll 138 F 6~3
(7th Cir. 1998).
.,
·
182. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1411 (11th Cir. 1997)
(Barkett, J., d1ssenting).
183. Haines, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 998 (M.D. Tenn. 1998).
184. Id. quoting Oona, 143 F.3d at 477.
185. Haines, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 998 (quoting North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456
U.S. 512, 521 (1982).
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C. Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education
The third Supreme Court decision in this recent trilogy of
cases concerning the various forms and contexts of sexual harassment occurred on May 24, 1999. In Davis v. Monroe County
Board of Education, 186 the Court addressed the issue of the
existence of a private cause of action for student to student
sexual harassment. The Davis decision represents the culmination in this series of Supreme Court decisions on sexual harassment which, in combination with the two earlier decisions,
provides the clearest guidance to date in this area oflaw.
In Davis, the Court answered the outstanding questions occupying the lower courts for the past decade. First, the Court
emphasized its decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools 18 7 where the Franklin Court concluded that there is
"an implied private right of action for money damages" 188 but
added that such damages "are available only where recipients
of federal funding had adequate notice that they could be liable
for the conduct at issue."189
Next, the Court addressed the issue of school district liability for the sexual harassment of a student by another student,
during the school day and on school property. After reiterating
Title IX's proscription against institutional liability for the acts
of individuals or third parties, the Davis Court concluded that
the plaintiff, LaShonda Davis, had properly stated a private
cause of action against the school district. This conclusion was
based on the district's own misconduct; namely its failure to
take any remedial or disciplinary steps to stop the harassing
conduct to which LaShonda Davis was subjected. As such,
Davis's complaint sought to hold the school district liable for its
deliberate indifference to known acts of sexual harassment, 190
and not the acts of a private third party (i.e. the student perpetrator).
The Davis Court also considered the applicability of the
Gebser standard in cases of student to student sexual harass186. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
187. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
188. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
189. Id. (1999) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 17
(1981)).
190. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (The Gebser
standard is directed at intentional discrimination by the educational institution itself,
not individual employees.).
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ment. In Gebser, the Court held that liability attaches "where
the district itself intentionally acted in clear violation of Title
IX by remaining deliberately indifferent to acts of teacherstudent harassment of which it had actual knowledge." 191 The
question in Davis concerned whether a school district's deliberate indifference to know acts of harassment amounted to an intentional violation of Title IX when the harasser was a student.
The answer to that question hinged on Title IX's notice requirement, the "recipient's degree of control over the harasser
and the environment in which the harassment occurs." 192 Relying on Franklin and Gebser, the Court concluded that "sexual
harassment is a form of discrimination" 193 under Title IX, and
Title IX's proscription against harassment is clear enough both
to meet the notice requirement in Pennhurst and to provide "a
basis for a damages action." 194 Further, Franklin and Gebser
required the Court "to conclude that student-on-student sexual
harassment, if sufficiently severe, can ... rise to the level of
discrimination actionable under" Title IX.l95
The Court, using the language of Title IX, linked the district's duty to protect students from harassment to the protection Title IX provides students against being '"excluded from
participation in' or 'denied the benefits of any 'educational program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."' 196 The
new standard of liability for student to student sexual harassment is taken from the Gebser standard, but tailored to the
unique responsibilities of school districts toward their students.
Under the new standard, liability will attach where recipients
of Federal fmancial assistance "are deliberately indifferent to
sexual harassment, of which they have actual knowledge, that
is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be
said to deprive the victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school." 197 However, the
Court distinguished between schools and adult workplaces.
This distinction leaves open the question of whether the Court

191. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (quoting Gebser,
524 U.S. at 290).
192. !d.
193. !d.
194. !d.
195. !d.
196. ld. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 168l(a) (1972)).
197. !d.
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has created different standards of liability based on the setting
in which the harassment occurs and the age of the victims and
perpetrators. In qualifying the Davis standard, the Court gives
the impression that it is not eager to provide the same level of
protection to students that adults can expect after Oncale. Further, the Court seems hesitant to clearly define the types of behaviors between students that constitute sexual harassment.
Instead, the Court stated that "[d]amages are not available for
simple acts of teasing and name-calling among school children, ... even where these comments target differences in gender."198 The Davis Court left to school administrators the task
of drawing the line between innocent teasing and actionable
sexual harassment. That is a task that school administrators
are ill equipped to address.
CONCLUSION

The Eleventh Circuit's 1996 ruling in Davis 199 created a
framework based on Title VII principles, subsequently used by
a number of courts 200 to determine school district liability for
hostile environment sexual harassment. But the recent ruling
by the Eleventh Circuit in Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education 201 has revealed an entirely new approach for student to student sexual harassment cases, particularly those involving same-gender sexual harassment. The Supreme Court's
decision in Davis also fits well with the recent Supreme Court
decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. and extends the Gebser standard. The combination of these opinions,
as well as a handful of other recent student to student sexual
harassment cases, could upset the majority of existing student
to student sexual harassment rulings.
In these recent cases, courts have taken care to explain the
rationale behind the standard they have chosen to apply in the
same-gender, co-worker, teacher-student, and student to stu-

198. Id. The Court went even further when it stated that "Courts, ... must bear in
mind that schools are unlike the adult workplace and that children may regularly in·
teract in a manner that would be unacceptable among adults." !d.
199. 74 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1996).
200. See Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F. 3d 495, 513, 515 (6th Cir. 1996); Kinman
v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 467-69 (8th Cir. 1996); Seamons v. Snow, 84
F.3d 1226, 1232-22 (lOth Cir. 1996).
201. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. ofEduc., 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997).
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dent sexual harassment cases. Unfortunately, the standard
chosen by these courts is not the standard that the majority of
lower courts have applied. Moreover, the new standard makes
it even easier for courts to protect the resources of school districts at the expense of student victims of sexual harassment.
While this has always been true, the Davis Court has painstakingly presented its reasons for selecting the Title VI standard for determining school district liability for student to student sexual harassment.
Very few students have ever been successful in sexual harassment cases. Frequently, the explanation offered by courts to
justify a holding of no school district liability seems contrived
and contrary to the evidence offered. Parents expect their children to be safe from abuse when they send their children to
school. When a child is sexually harassed by other students,
parents expect school officials to know about the abuse and to
take the necessary steps to stop the abuse. Under the existing
standards of liability, it is unlikely that students will be able to
prove that school district officials knew of the harassment because it is not clear which school officials must know in order to
establish the requisite notice of discriminatory conduct. Even if
the proper notice is established, courts have concluded that
whatever action school officials take is sufficient to overcome
the deliberate indifference requirement in virtually every instance, even where the abuse is not stopped. The future direction of student sexual harassment case law is uncertain at best.
But even though post-Davis courts will apply the new, stricter
approach to school district liability, it will be beneficial to finally know what the accepted standard of liability is in this
evolving area of law.

